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The Impact of Terrorism on Governance in African Countries 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates how terrorism affects governance in 53 African countries for the 
period 1998-2012. Four terrorism indicators are used namely: domestic, transnational, unclear 
and total terrorism. Ten bundled and unbundled governance indicators are also employed 
namely: political governance (consisting of political stability and voice and accountability), 
economic governance (encompassing government effectiveness and regulation quality); 
institutional governance (entailing corruption-control and the rule of law) and general 
governance. The governance indicators are bundled by means of principal component 
analysis. The empirical evidence is based on Generalized Method of Moments. Three key 
findings are established. First, all selected terrorism dynamics negatively affect political 
governance and its constituents. Second, evidence of a negative relationship is sparingly 
apparent in economic governance and its components.  Third, no proof was confirmed in 
relation to the impact of terrorism and institutional governance with its elements. Fourth, 
compared with domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism more negatively and significantly 
affects political, economic and general governances.  Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 There are two main reasons motivating this inquiry, namely:  (i) growth trends of 
terrorism in Africa and (ii) gaps in the literature.  
First, terrorism is a growing concern in Africa (Alfa-Wali et al., 2015). Whereas 
terrorism in not entirely new on the continent, the magnitude with which it is increasing is 
dismal. Today Africa is a fertile environment for the growth of terrorism because of a plethora 
of characteristics, among others: religious fundamentalism, tribal and ethnic tensions, growing 
regional and political instability and ideologies of extremists groups that are lobbying to 
establish new states in replacement of old ones (Fazel, 2013). Whereas the world is currently 
focusing on the Middle East comparatively, Africa is not being given the scholarly attention it 
disserves, in spite of growing radicalization and Islamic fundamentalism therein (Clavarino, 
2014). Some notable examples of such extremist groups include: al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb, the Boko Haram of Nigeria and al-Shabab in Somalia.  
Second, whereas the substantial bulk of the literature has focused on governance as a 
tool in mitigating terrorism, scholarly focus on the influence of terrorism on governance is 
limited. Accordingly, the literature on whether good governance promotes or mitigates 
terrorism has been the subject of much debate in the literature (see Lee, 2013). There is a 
branch of the literature which argues that some fundamental characteristics in good 
governance can reduce the likelihood of terrorism (or recruitment by terrorists’ organizations) 
by reducing resentment towards the State (Windsor, 2003; Li, 2005). Conversely, another 
stream of the literature disputes that good governance is not an important instrument in 
reducing terrorism because in democratic politics, terrorist interests are represented in the 
institutions of government (see Gause, 2005). In essence, societies with comparatively better 
levels of democratic institutions can harbor terrorism because there are a series of features in 
these societies that are conducive for the growth of terrorism. These consist of among others: 
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civil liberties, freedom and access to media and freedom of speech in the expression of 
dissatisfaction and disagreement (Ross, 1993). While political access theories (see Eyerman, 
1998) argue that the relationship between good governance and terrorism is weak because of 
features like judicial independence (Findley & Young, 2011); rule of law (Choi, 2010) and 
better conditions for conflict management (Li, 2005); another stream of the literature argues 
that terrorism is more likely to develop in conditions of government instability (Lai 2007; 
Piazza 2008a). The latter perspective is consistent with a broad stream of literature (Schmid, 
1992; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Piazza, 2007).  
To be sure, much of the literature has focused on the effect of governance on 
terrorism. We contribute to the literature by assessing the reverse relationship. It is important 
to investigate the effect of terrorism on governance because from intuition, terrorism is likely 
to affect inter alia: (i) political governance or the election and replacement of political 
leaders; (ii) economic governance or the formulation and implementation of policies that 
deliver public commodities and (iii) institutional governance or the respect by citizens and the 
State of institutions that govern interactions between them. Hence, terrorism can substantially 
affect the role of government in many separate areas, notably improvements in standards of 
living (Fosu, 2013; Fonchingong, 2014; Anyanwu &  Erhijakpor 2014) and societal change 
(Fosu, 2015).  
 The inquiry also contributes to the literature by improving the harmony between the 
conception and measurement of governance. For instance, whereas political governance is 
often used in many scholarly circles, the concept is misplaced unless it is justified by some 
empirical validity. Given that political governance is a combination of ‘voice and 
accountability’ and political stability/no violence, a composite indicator encompassing the 
two underlying indictors is needed for the employment of the term ‘political governance’. In 
other words, it is inappropriate to use some concepts of governance without the employment 
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of some preliminary techniques to bundle constituents of governance variables into 
composite/representative indicators. Hence, the inquiry contributes to the literature on 
consequences of terrorism on the one hand and to the growing literature on measuring 
governance on the other hand. We use both composite and sub-components of governance 
variables in order to increase room for policy implications. 
The remainder of the paper is structrued as follows. Section 2 discusses and clarifies 
the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of governance concepts.  The data and 
methodology are covered in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes with policy implications.  
 
2. Clarification of governance and theoretical underpinnings 
2.1 Clarification of governance  
In this section, we elicit governance concepts. Consistent with Asongu (2016), governance is 
a multidimensional and complex phenomenon that has many definitions.  
First, Dixit (2009, p. 5) defines economic governance as  ‘… structure and 
functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic activity and economic 
transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action to 
provide physical and organizational infrastructure’.  
Second, according to Fukuyama (2013), a more comprehensive notion of governance 
encompasses four main features, namely: procedural measures, output measures, indicators of 
capacity that entail professionalism and resources and bureaucratic measures. 
Third, consistent with Tusalem (2015), the notion of governance embodies: 
bureaucratic effectiveness, corruption-control, the rule of law, regulation quality and political 
stability.  
Fourth, models of governance from Kaufmann et al. (2010) have been the most 
widely employed in the literature. Three main indicators of governance are suggested by the 
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authors, namely political, economic and institutional dynamics.  (i) Political governance is 
defined as the election and replacement of political leaders. It is measured by two indicators: 
political stability/no violence and voice and accountability. (ii) Economic governance is 
defined as the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities. It 
is also measured by two indicators: regulation quality and government effectiveness. (iii) 
Institutional governance is defined as the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that 
govern interactions between them. Again, it is measured by two variables: corruption-control 
and the rule of law.  
Despite the wide acceptance enjoyed by the indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010), 
several criticisms have been levelled on the quality of these measures from scholarly circles. 
However, Mastruzzi, Kraay and Kaufmann have been providing prompt rebuttals to such 
criticisms in order to provide assurances in the confidence enjoyed by their governance 
variables. The debate by Marcus Kurtz and Andrew Schrank is one of the most notable in the 
literature. It can be summarised into four main strands, namely: ‘models, measures and 
mechanisms”; a reply; a defense and a rejoinder (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007ab; Kaufmann et al., 
2007ab).  We briefly discuss the elements in chronological order.   
First, doubts have been raised by Kurtz and Schrank (2007a) about the consensus that 
good governance is positively linked to economic development. According to them, in the 
empirical literature on the governance-growth relationship, there is an exaggeration in the 
confidence afforded to the governance indicators from Mastruzzi, Kraay and Kaufmann. They 
remarked that the governance indicators are problematic mainly because of concerns 
associated with: perceptual biases; sampling adverse selection and conceptual conflation with 
policy choices.  
Second, in response, Kaufmann et al. (2007a) use the following three points to argue 
that the claims by Schrank and Kurtz (2007a) are not substantiated. (i) They argue that the 
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anxieties pertaining to  ‘perception-oriented measurement biases’ are speculative, falsifiable 
and do not withstand empirical scrutiny. (ii) To further substantiate this point, they provided 
empirical justification for the support of their position that the contending argument on a 
short-term relationship between governance and economic development is conceptually 
flawed and statistically fragile. (iii) They have also debunked the empirical standpoint raised 
by the contenders on the impact of governance and growth.  
Third, in order to defend their earlier position, Kurtz and Schrank (2007b), have 
responded to Kaufmann et al. (2007a) by further arguing  that the underlying issues raised on 
measurement bias and conceptual conflation are solidly grounded from empirical debates 
underpinning on the governance-growth relationship.   
Fourth, in a rejoinder, Kaufmann et al. (2007b) have reiterated the absence of 
empirical basis to the criticism maintained in Kurtz and Schrank (2007b). They argued that 
the worries about ‘potential respondant bias’ are not limited exclusively to the appreciation of 
government effectiveness, but well extend to other variables. In the light of these 
clarifications, in the discussion of empirical underpinnings and analysis that follow, our 
conception and definition of governance is consistent with Kaufmann et al. (2010). 
 
2.2 Empirical literature  
 According to Enders and Sandler (2006), terrorism can be understood as threatened 
use of force by sub-national actors for the goal of employing intimidation to secure political 
goals. Hence, by definition terrorism is designed to either influence political governance 
positively or negatively. But we argue that the definition could also be extended to economic 
and institutional governances. On the one hand, terrorism can influence economic governance 
because it is logical to resort to violence as means of manifesting grievances on the poor 
formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities. Such terror may 
8 
 
either affect economic governance positively or negatively.  On the other hand, terrorism can 
also influence institutional governance when the State fails to respect institutions that govern 
interactions between citizens and the State. The outcome could also either be positive or 
negative. The empirical underpinnings linking terrorism and governance can be discussed in 
three main branches: (i) linkages between domestic terrorism and governance; (ii) the nexus 
between governance and transnational terrorism and (iii) relationships between governance 
and terrorism.  
 First, on the relationship with domestic terrorism, Choi (2010) argued that governance 
is related to domestic terrorism in the view that ordinary citizens are gifted with incentives to 
use violence against the government, institutions, other citizens and political figures under 
three scenarios, namely, when they: (i) hold grievances, (ii) find no peaceful avenues of 
solving grievances, hopelessness and sentiments of desperation and (iii) perceive the 
employment of terror as a legitimate and viable action of last resort to communicate their 
anger and frustration. The bases of this logic is founded on the intuition that citizens would  
use terrorism as a pragmatic means to influencing governance in the absence of peaceful 
mechanisms for  resolving conflicts and/or manifesting their grievances. Within this 
framework, we postulate that citizens are likely to use terror channels to influence political, 
economic and institutional governances, when they lack peaceful options with which to 
communicate their grievances.  
Second, on the link between transnational terrorism and governance, in light of the 
discourse already provided in the first strand, good governance is also expected to consolidate 
political, economic and institutional systems that on the one hand protect both citizens and 
foreigners and that on the other hand, avail nonviolent channels by which conflicts can be 
resolved (Choi, 2010). Moreover, transnational terrorism can influence domestic governments 
to improve their governance standards in order to prevent further escalation and contagion of 
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domestic terrorism. The connection between transnational terrorism and governance is logical 
because transnational terrorism can be used to influence foreign policy by domestic 
governments. This conforms to the findings of Savun and Phillips (2009) which showed that 
transnational terrorism is associated with foreign policy (regardless of political regime types). 
According to the narrative, a country’s foreign policy influences resentment abroad and 
transnational terrorism can be used as means for influencing domestic governments to alter 
their foreign policies.  
In the light of foundations in the first-two strands, terrorism can induce, among others 
(i) political governance or free and fair democratic process for the election and replacement of 
political leaders; (ii) economic governance or the formulation and implementation of policies 
that provide public goods to citizens and (iii) institutional governance or the respect by 
citizens and the State of institutions that govern interactions between them.  
 The third strand engages some debate surrounding the nexus between terrorism and 
governance. Following Hoffman et al. (2013), studies on the relationship between cross-
national terrorism and governance are founded on the scholarship that opportunities of 
violence can be used against regime-based disparities. Within this framework, terrorism is 
more likely to be used against bad governance than good governance. However, it is 
important to balance this description with the view that good governance offers more 
opportunities of dealing with grievances and some recalcitrant citizens might abuse such 
liberties by employing violence as a means of making their complaints heard.  
 Moreover, terror is likely to be employed to influence governance in failed and/or 
failing states than in stable autocracies (see Schmid, 1992; Eubank & Weinberg (1994); 
Drakos & Gofas, 2006; Piazza, 2007; Lai 2007; Piazza 2008a). Conversely, political access 
theories (see Eyerman, 1998) argue that the relationship between good governance and 
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terrorism is weak because of features like judicial independence (Findley & Young, 2011); 
rule of law (Choi, 2010) and better conditions for conflict management (Li, 2005). 
 From an empirical standpoint, the linkage between transnational terrorism and 
democratic institutions of government has been substantially documented (Eubank & 
Weinberg, 1994, 2001; Piazza, 2007, 2008b; Weinberg & Eubank, 1998; Lee, 2013). 
Additionally, Chenoweth (2010) argued that good governance with democratic competition 
could provide a conducive environment for violent actions. According to Li (2005), two 
competing impacts of democracy are apparent. On the one hand, constraints in government 
can increase transnational terrorism owing to deadlock from checks and balances. On the 
other, democratic participation reduces incidents of transnational terrorism.  
  Noticeably, much of the empirical literature has focused on the effect of governance 
on terrorism. In the light of discussed empirical underpinnings, we contribute to the literature 
by assessing the reverse relationship. 
 
2.3 Stylized facts and theoretical underpinnings  
2.3.1 Intuition and theoretical underpinnings  
 In this section, we discuss the intuition and theoretical underpinnings showing why a 
country besieged by terrorism may have concerns associated with political governance, 
economic governance and institutional governance. These three dimensions of governance are 
discussed in turn.  
 Consistent with the literature (Laver & Shepsle, 1998; Williams, 2012), some specific 
terrorist events affect political governance. First, events of terrorism could influence the 
policy options adopted by political parties owing to shifting interests in constituencies. As 
substantiated by Indridason (2008), when confronted with incidents of terrorism, political 
coalitions are more likely to be created. Accordingly, it is more probable that political entities 
which share common policy options create coalitions in order to meet common public 
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demands in the face of terrorism. Second, terrorism can change the political climate and raise 
the stakes of some policies that are prioritised by the political agenda. Third, there is a 
substantial body of literature which maintains that incidences of terrorism affect election 
anticipations because voters are likely to punish governing parties for ensuring their 
protection (see Berrebi & Klor, 2006; Siqueira & Sandler, 2007). The fact that terrorism 
influences political governance in terms of voice and accountability and political stability/no 
violence has been confirmed in recent empirical literature (Indridason, 2008; Williams, 2012). 
Some country-specific cases where terrorism has affected political governance include: (i) the 
United States of America after the September 11
th
, 2001 attack (Jacobson, 2003; Langer & 
Cohen, 2005) and (ii) Turkey where terror incidents influence the outcome of political 
elections (Kibris, 2010).  
It is important to note that terrorism can either influence the underlying political 
governance concepts positively or negatively. For instance, terrorism could deteriorate the 
political governance like it is the case with Iraq today (Geneva International Centre for 
Justice, 2014). On the other hand, terrorism could also improve political accountability like 
the situation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria where the MEND (the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta) has called for more accountability in the management of oil 
wealth.  In summary, terrorism may affect political stability by impacting on the likelihood 
that governments can be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent means. 
Moreover, the phenomenon can also influence voice and accountability by affecting the extent 
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.   
 Terrorism is also very likely to influence economic governance activities because it 
affects both government effectiveness and regulation quality. From an economic governance 
perspective, it affects the ability of the government to effectively implement policies that are 
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designed to deliver public commodities. For example, as documented by Tabor (2016), 
terrorism in the Delta region of Nigeria has been substantially constrained the ability of the 
government to provide public goods to citizens of the area. It follows that terrorism can 
influence government effectiveness by affecting, inter alia: the quality of public services, the 
quality of policy formulation  process, and the credibility of governments’ commitments to 
the implementation of such policies. Terrorism can also affect regulation quality by 
influencing the ability of the government to articulate sound policies as well as to effectively 
communicate and enforce the rules and guidelines that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
 With regard to institutional governance, the respect by the State and citizens of 
institutions that govern interactions between them is less likely to occur in the presence of 
terrorism. Notable contemporary examples include: the Libyan experience which has almost 
become a failed State and the lawlessness in some parts of Northern Nigeria where the 
influence of Boko Haram still pervades. Efobi and Asongu (2016) have recently shown that 
terrorism decreases the rule of law and increases corruption which, inter alia, reduces 
institutional governance and increases capital flight.  If follows that terrorism can influence 
the rule of law by affecting the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Terrorism can also affect 
the control of corruption by  influencing the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the 
state by elites and private interests. 
 
2.3.2 Stylized facts supporting theoretical underpinnings and testable hypotheses  
 Figures 1-3 below respectively show relationships between various governance 
dynamics and terrorism variables. In essence Figure 1 illustrates linkages between domestic 
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terrorism and governance while Figure 2 shows corresponding relationships between 
transnational terrorism and governance. Finally, the nexus between institutional governance 
and unclear terrorism is disclosed in Figure 3. We consistently observe that a negative linkage 
is apparent when graphs are viewed both vertically and horizontally. However, it is important 
to note that the negative relationship between terrorism and governance is most apparent with 
political governance. Hence while the graphs substantiate the intuition and theoretical 
underpinnings on a negative relationship between governance and terrorism, such a negative 
linkage may be most significant between terrorism and political governance. This is 
essentially because from the stylized facts, the governance dynamic with the highest 
sensitivity to terrorism is political governance. We attempt to validate this perception with 
additional proof in the empirical section. The corresponding hypothesis to be tested is the 
following. 
 
Hypothesis: Compared to economic governance and institutional governance, political 
governance is most sensitive to all the dynamics of terrorism.  
 
Figure 1: Domestic terrorism (Domter) and governance  
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Figure 2: Transnational terrorism (Transter) and governance  
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Figure 3: Unclear terrorism (Unter) and governance  
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 It is important to note that we are using exploratory results to drive theoretical 
expectations. This approach is not uncommon in the  style of writing in previous scientific 
scholarly papers.  Accordingly, the established correlations (in the exploratory analysis) are 
not causalities and hence, an empirical section of this study could be positioned on the 
hypotheses of assessing whether exploratory relationships withstand further statistical 
scrutiny. This is the object of the sections that follow.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 We investigate a panel of 53 African countries with data for the period 1998-2012 
from: (i) the Global Terrorism Database, (ii) African Development Indicators (ADI) and 
World Governance Indicators of the World Bank and (iii) terrorism incidents from Enders et 
al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012). The periodicity under investigation ends in the year 
2012 because of data availability constraints, notably: (i) macroeconomic and institutional 
indicators from the ADI of the World Bank on the one hand and (ii) terrorism variables from 
Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012) on the other. The period of study starts from 
1998 because governance variables from World Governance Indicators are only available 
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from the year 1996. The year 1998 is chosen in order to enable the computation of three year 
non-overlapping data averages. The interest of using three-year data averages is to limit 
instrument proliferation (see the estimation technique Section 3.2.2) and mitigate short-run 
disturbances that may loom substantially (Islam, 1995, p. 323). Hence, we have five three-
year non-overlapping intervals: 1998-2000; 2001-2003; 2004-2006; 2007-2009 and 2010-
2012. The focus on Africa is because some of the lowest levels of quality of governance are 
likely to be found there (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015).  Moreover, the high frequency of 
civil wars and political strife in this continent has left a legacy of poor governance (Boyce & 
O’Donnell, 2007; Boyce & Forman, 2010).  
The dependent variables are  six unbundled governance indicators; namely: the rule of 
law, corruption-control, regulation quality, government effectiveness, voice and 
accountability and political stability plus four bundled measures, notably political governance, 
economic governance, institutional governance and general governance. While the first-six 
are individual governance measures from Kaufmann et al. (2010), the last-four are composite 
indicators that are combined by means of the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique 
(discussed in Section 3.2.1)
1
. Such unbundled (Gani, 2011; Andrés et al., 2015; Yerrabit & 
Hawkes, 2015) and bundled governance (Asongu, 2015, 2016) variables are increasingly 
being used in the literature
2
.  
                                                 
1
 It is important to clarify how the definition and conceptualization of political governance may affect the 
operationalization of the dependent variable. This is essentially because one of its constituents (i.e. ‘political 
stability/no violence’) is conceptually linked to terrorism. Political governance is different from terrorism on 
three main counts. First, they are different by conception and definition as outlined in the study.  Second, they 
represent different policy signals. Whereas terrorism is a negative signal, political governance is a positive 
signal. Third, whereas a component of political governance (i.e. ‘political stability/no violence’) may be related 
to terrorism, from a conceptual standpoint, corresponding definitions and signals (positive versus negative) are 
different. Moreover, political stability/no violence is complemented with ‘voice and accountability’ (which is 
conceptually distinct from terrorism) to produce ‘political governance’. In summary, of the ten governance 
indicators employed, the concern about definition/conceptualization which we have clarified is only related to 
one dependent variable. 
2
 While we have highlighted the criticisms and corresponding rebuttals on the governance indicators in Section 
2, the choice of the governance indicators from the World Bank is because of: (i) the wide usage of such 
variables in the literature and (ii) the fact that the variables are freely accessible. Moreover, we do not have the 
financial means to purchase alternative governance variables from the International Country Risk Guide. 
17 
 
Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by 
subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006). Four different but connected terrorism dependent indicators are 
used. They are:  (i) dynamics of domestic, (ii) transnational, (iii) unclear and (iv) total 
terrrorism. These endogenous variables account for most of the numbers of yearly terrorism 
incidents registered in a country within a year. In order to prevent mathematical concerns 
relating to the log-transformation of zeros and correction of the positive skewness in our data 
distribution, the study takes the natural logarithm of terrorism incidents by adding one to the 
base number. This conversion approach is consistent with recent literature (Choi & Salehyan, 
2013; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, 
p. 6). Domestic terrorism “includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the 
nationals of the venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and 
supporters are all from the venue country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “terrorism 
including those acts that concern at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, 
supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from 
another”.  Unclear terrorism is that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can 
neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum 
of domestic, transnational and unclear terrorisms
3
.  
In order to ensure that estimated results are not biased by omitted variables, this paper 
includes seven control variables. They comprise (i) a lagged governance variable, (ii) internet 
penetration, (iii) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, (iv) inflation rate, (v) foreign direct 
investment (FDI), (vi) education and (vii) government expenditure. Information technologies 
including the internet and mobile phones have been documented to increase government 
                                                 
3
 The purpose of using multiple types of terrorism variables is consistent with recent terrorism literature 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017). Moreover, in order to increase room for policy 
implications, it is important to engage the available terrorism and governance indicators. Such should reduce 
errors associated from variable-selection bias.  
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quality because they improve space for accountability and transparency (Boulianne, 2009; 
Snow, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 2014). Countries with high income levels have 
also been documented to be associated with higher levels of government quality in Africa 
(Asongu, 2012, p.191). Rising consumer prices are very likely to influence governance by 
prompting authorities to device and implement policies that keep food prices in-check. 
Financial globalisation in the perspective of FDI has been recognised to positively affect 
political governance (Lalountas et al., 2011). Lederman et al. (2005) and Cheung and Chan 
(2008) have established that education increases governance indicators. Government 
expenditure is also strongly associated with improvement governance measures (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a). Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1, the summary 
statistics in Appendix 2 and the correlation matrix in Appendix 3
4
.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 In accordance with recent governance (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b) and 
development (Tchamyou, 2016) literature, this study employs PCA in order to bundle 
governance indicators. The PCA is a widely employed statistical approach that is  used to 
reduce a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables known 
as principal components (PCs). Consistent with the motivation of this study, it is important to 
note that the bundling of governance indicators is also to clarify some governance concepts 
that are employed without statistical relevance. The high degree of substitution between 
governance variables is disclosed in Appendix 3.  The criterion for the retention of common 
                                                 
4
 While there might be concerns that the control variables could also correlate with some of the causal 
mechanisms by which terrorism influences governance, the following three points clarify the concerns: (i) the 
degree of substitution among control variables is low; (ii) the degree of substitution between terrorism and the 
control variables is not high and (iii) the Generalised Method of Moments technique is designed to address 
concerns of simultaneity through the process of instrumentation. 
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factors is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). The authors have recommended the 
retention of PCs with an eignvalue higher than the mean.  
 From Table 1, it is apparent that the first PC of general governance is 4.787 with a 
corresponding percentage of variation of 79.7%. This implies that approximately 79% of 
variations from the six governance variables are contained in the composite governance 
variable (G.gov). The narrative on total variations and eigenvalues is in line with other  
combined governance indicators; namely: political governance (Polgov) which has more than 
82% of variation and an eigenvalue of 1.647; economic governance (Ecogov) has an 
eigenvalue of 1.863 with more than 93% of variation from constituent indicators and 
institutional governance (Instgov) displays an eigenvalue of 1.867 with approximately 94% of 
information contained in the corruption-control and the rule of law variables.  
 Instgov (or institutional governance) is the respect by the State and citizens of 
institutions that govern interactions between them. Ecogov (or economic governance) is the 
formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities. Polgov (or 
political governance) is defined as the election and replacement of political leaders. The 
definitions are consistent with the governance literature (Kaufmann et al., 2007ab, 2010; 
Andrés et al., 2015)
5
.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The fact that we do not retain more than one principal component for a given governance dynamic is consistent 
with recent governance literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c). Accordingly, for some governance indicators 
(e.g. institutional governance and economic governance), the first PC contains more than 93% of common 
information in the constituent indicators. We do not find the remaining 7% very significant. Moreover, if we are 
to use a second principal component representing the 7% variation, we shall need to provide a ‘governance 
name’ to it (e.g. ‘Economic Governance 2’ given that ‘Economic Governance 1’ corresponds to the first 
principal with a 93% variation).  
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Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.385 0.370 0.412 0.426 0.440 0.412 0.797 0.797 4.787 
Second  PC 0.093 0.850 -0.364 -0.343 0.007 -0.140 0.072 0.870 0.437 
Third PC 0.862 -0.179 0.122 -0.192 -0.182 -0.373 0.058 0.929 0.353 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.823 0.823 1.647 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.176 1.000 0.352 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.931 0.931 1.863 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.068 1.000 0.137 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.933 0.933 1.867 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.066 1.000 0.132 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation specification  
 At least five factors motivate the choice of the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) (Asongu & De Moor, 2017). First, the dependent variables should be persistent. As 
shown in Appendix 4, the correlation between the dependent variables and their first lags is 
higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 that is required to establish persistence in 
dependent variables. Second, the number of countries (N) is higher than the number of years 
per country (T). Hence, the sample of the study is consistent with the N (53)>T(5) criterion. 
Third, the estimation strategy accounts for endogeneity in the all regressors. Fourth, cross-
country variations are not eliminated with the estimation approach. Fifth, the system GMM 
technique corrects for biases in small samples that are inherent in the difference estimator. It 
is fundamentally for this fifth reason that Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) have recommended that 
the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) be preferred to 
the difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991).  
 Within the specific context of this study, the Arellano and Bover (1995) extension by 
Roodman (2009ab) is adopted. The strategy employs forward orthogonal deviations in place 
of first differences. The estimation strategy has been documented to restrict over-
identification (or limit instrument proliferation) and account for cross sectional dependence 
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(see Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). In the specification strategy, a two-step approach 
is adopted in place of the one-step because it controls for heteroscedasticity.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
 tititih
h
htititi WTGG ,,,
6
1
,2,10,    

                                  (1)     
  









 titttihtih
h
h
titititititi
WW
TTGGGG
,2,,,,
6
1
,,22,,1,,
)()(
)()(
                                 
(2)            
 
Where: tiG ,  
is a governance indicator (political, economic or institutional governance) of 
country i
 
at  period t ; tiT , , is a terrorism variable (domestic, transnational, unclear and total);  
0  
is a constant;
 
 represents tau; W  is the vector of control variables  (internet penetration, 
GDP growth, inflation, foreign direct investment, education and government expenditure);
 i

 
is the country-specific effect, t  
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. 
 
3.2.3 Identification and exclusion restriction 
 We treat all independent variables as predetermined or suspected endogenous 
variables (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014). Therefore, the gmmstyle is 
adopted for them and only years are treated as exogenous and the approach for treating the 
ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ because it is not possible for the years to become 
endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b).  
 In order to tackle the issue of simultaneity, lagged regressors are used as instruments 
for forward-differenced indicators. Hence, in order to eliminate fixed impacts that could affect 
the investigated connections, Helmet transformations are performed for the regressors, in line 
with Love and Zicchino (2006) and Arellano and Bover (1995). These conversions consist of 
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forward mean-differencing of the indicators: instead of subtracting the previous observation 
for the contemporaneous one (see Roodman, 2009b, p. 104), the mean of all future 
observations are deducted from the variables.  
 The adjustment ensures parallel and orthogonal conditions between the forward-
differenced and lagged values. Regardless of the number of lags, in order to minimise loss of 
data, the underlying transformations are computed for all observations with the exception of 
the last for each cross-section “And because lagged observations do not enter the formula, 
they are valid as instruments” (Roodman, 2009b, p. 104). 
 In this study, the impact of instruments or years  is considered as having strictly 
exogenous influence on the chosen governance indicators exclusively through the endogenous 
variables. The statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is examined with the Difference 
in the Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments. Whereas in a standard 
instrumental variable (IV) approach, rejection of the alternative hypothesis of the Sargan 
Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test implies that the instruments do not  clarify the 
dependent variable beyond the proposed mechanisms (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016d), the DHT is the information criterion in the GMM approach because it 
examines if years as an instrument exhibit strict exogeneity. Therefore, the exclusion 
restriction is confirmed if the alternative hypothesis of the DHT corresponding to IV (year, 
eq(diff)) is rejected. 
 
4. Empirical analysis  
4.1 Presentation of results  
 Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 respectively present findings corresponding to 
political governance, economic governance, institutional governance and general governance. 
For each table, four principal information criteria are employed to examine the validity of 
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GMM models with forward orthogonal deviations
6
. Judging from these criteria, the estimated 
models and corresponding instruments are overwhelmingly valid.  
 The following findings are established from Table 2. All terrorism dynamics 
negatively affect political governance and its constituents, with the negative magnitudes 
higher from transnational terrorism compared to domestic terrorism. In Table 3, some models 
are not valid because of post-estimation presence of autocorrelation in the residuals. The 
negative terrorism-governance linkages are only scantily apparent in: (i) transnational 
terrorism for regulation quality, (ii) domestic and total terrorism for government effectiveness 
and (iii) transnational terrorism for government effectiveness. Ultimately, transnational 
terrorism consistently negatively affects economic governance and its components. In Table 
4, institutional governance and its elements are not significantly affected by terrorism 
dynamics whereas in Table 5, the negative effects are only apparent from transnational and 
total terrorisms. The significant control variables have expected signs for the most part.  
 
 Table 2: Political Governance and Terrorism    
             
 Dependent Variables: Political  Governance  Dynamics 
    
 Voice and Accountability  (VA) Political Stability  (PS) Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Constant  -0.104** -0.119** -0.138 -0.099** -0.331*** -0.277*** -0.191 -0.316*** -0.190 -0.125 -0.128 -0.128 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.004) (0.041) (0.002) (0.001) (0.121) (0.001) (0.124) (0.117) (0.402) (0.297) 
VA(-1) 0.959*** 0.942*** 0.974*** 0.947*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
PS(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.798*** 0.819*** 0.771*** 0.699*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Polgov(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.987*** 0.934*** 0.938*** 0.980*** 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Terrorism  -0.043*** --- --- --- -0.154*** --- --- --- -0.109*** --- ---- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.002)    
Transnational Terrorism  --- -0.100*** --- --- --- -0.464*** --- --- --- -0.385*** --- --- 
                                                 
6
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen 
overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the 
positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test 
is not robust, but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order 
to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower 
than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a 
Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
The second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) is more relevant as information criterion than 
the first-order because some papers exclusively report the higher order with no disclosure of the first order 
(Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b).  The Sargan test is not robust but not 
weakened by instruments while the Hansen test is robust but weakened by instruments. A logical way of 
addressing the conflict is to adopt the Hansen test and avoid the proliferation of instruments. Instrument 
proliferation is then avoided by ensuring that the number of instruments in each specification is lower than the 
corresponding number of cross sections. 
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  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Unclear Terrorism  --- --- -0.169*** --- --- --- -0.543*** --- --- --- -0.372*** --- 
   (0.008)    (0.000)    (0.000)  
Total Terrorism   --- --- --- -0.045*** --- --- --- -0.232*** --- --- --- -0.151*** 
    (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Internet  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** -0.002 0.006** 0.004 -0.0009 0.008** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.525) (0.022) (0.132) (0.774) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
GDP growth  0.015** 0.007 0.016** 0.012** 0.016* 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.036*** 0.022 0.017 0.031** 
 (0.012) (0.178) (0.013) (0.041) (0.090) (0.373) (0.706) (0.598) (0.007) (0.106) (0.110) (0.023) 
Inflation   0.005 0.006 0.008* 0.004 0.017*** 0.031*** 0.007 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 
 (0.198) (0.327) (0.057) (0.222) (0.001) (0.000) (0.242) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign investment  -0.002 -0.0008 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.0002 -0.004* -0.011*** -0.007* -0.008** -0.011*** 
 (0.117) (0.577) (0.223) (0.198) (0.274) (0.253) (0.900) (0.057) (0.033) (0.097) (0.031) (0.003) 
Education    -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.0006 0.0001 0.003* -0.003 -0.005** -0.004* -0.004 
 (0.231) (0.281) (0.108) (0.299) (0.175) (0.588) (0.944) (0.068) (0.234) (0.033) (0.058) (0.128) 
Government Expenditure -0.001 -0.00009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.0009* -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.137) (0.871) (0.257) (0.156) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.162) (0.070) (0.999) (0.129) 
             
AR(1) (0.041) (0.021) (0.059) (0.033) (0.101) (0.150) (0.097) (0.106) (0.062) (0.030) (0.072) (0.042) 
AR(2) (0.923) (0.977) (0.746) (0.940) (0.507) (0.925) (0.966) (0.351) (0.497) (0.495) (0.395) (0.544) 
Sargan OIR (0.298) (0.656) (0.361) (0.378) (0.030) (0.084) (0.133) (0.105) (0.018) (0.346) (0.085) (0.074) 
Hansen OIR (0.187) (0.143) (0.144) (0.179) (0.315) (0.489) (0.425) (0.611) (0.579) (0.453) (0.355) (0.617) 
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.337) (0.635) (0.617) (0.225) (0.515) (0.393) (0.335) (0.365) (0.298) (0.864) (0.743) (0.261) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.183) (0.067) (0.071) (0.237) (0.241) (0.513) (0.479) (0.686) (0.705) (0.218) (0.190) (0.782) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.197) (0.200) (0.200) (0.217) (0.451) (0.690) (0.482) (0.557) (0.403) (0.349) (0.339) (0.436) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.298) (0.159) (0.163) (0.217) (0.136) (0.111) (0.263) (0.559) (0.976) (0.718) (0.406) (0.989) 
             
Fisher  298.43*** 468.8*** 442.0*** 339.0*** 409.06*** 789.17*** 236.8*** 328.77*** 237.95*** 1522.5*** 164.4*** 330.1*** 
Instruments  34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Countries  46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Observations  131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the 
validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
 
Table 3: Economic Governance and Terrorism    
             
 Dependent Variables: Economic Governance  Dynamics 
    
 Regulation Quality   (RQ) Government Effectiveness   (GE) Economic Governance (Ecogov) 
    
Constant  -0.347*** -0.211*** -0.320*** -0.347*** -0.377*** -0.303*** -0.382*** -0.292*** -0.556*** -0.453*** -0.486*** -0.547*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
RQ(-1) 0.830*** 0.874*** 0.846*** 0.808*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
GE(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.824*** 0.858*** 0.898*** 0.830*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Ecogov (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.934*** 0.912*** 0.931*** 0.901*** 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Terrorism  0.004 --- --- --- -0.052*** --- --- --- 0.009 --- --- --- 
 (0.819)    (0.003)    (0.796)    
Transnational Terrorism  --- -0.093*** --- --- --- -0.126*** --- --- --- -0.184*** --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Unclear Terrorism  --- --- 0.055 --- --- --- -0.050 --- --- --- 0.074 --- 
   (0.228)    (0.167)    (0.286)  
Total Terrorism   --- --- --- -0.0005 --- --- --- -0.059*** --- --- --- -0.027 
    (0.976)    (0.000)    (0.397) 
Internet  -0.004* 0.001 -0.003 -0.004** -0.003 -0.0007 -0.007*** -0.001 -0.014** -0.002 -0.010** -0.009** 
 (0.074) (0.367) (0.108) (0.041) (0.155) (0.726) (0.001) (0.386) (0.010) (0.378) (0.012) (0.044) 
GDP growth  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (0.472) (0.275) (0.404) (0.224) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation   0.003 -0.0006 0.001 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.001 0.001 -0.0002 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.549) (0.857) (0.717) (0.899) (0.957) (0.630) (0.758) (0.942) (0.864) (0.371) (0.884) (0.829) 
Foreign investment  0.002 0.002** 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.0007 -0.001 -0.002* 0.0008 0.001 0.002 0.0003 
 (0.248) (0.048) (0.206) (0.171) (0.113) (0.516) (0.286) (0.070) (0.636) (0.370) (0.126) (0.871) 
Education 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Government Expenditure 0.0006 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0005 -0.0009** -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0006* 0.001 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.124) (0.000) (0.003) (0.167) (0.037) (0.408) (0.164) (0.077) (0.104) (0.000) (0.053) (0.086) 
             
AR(1) (0.237) (0.315) (0.183) (0.355) (0.253) (0.250) (0.344) (0.235) (0.305) (0.215) (0.210) (0.309) 
AR(2) (0.034) (0.147) (0.040) (0.047) (0.329) (0.070) (0.169) (0.286) (0.106) (0.101) (0.112) (0.122) 
Sargan OIR (0.726) (0.873) (0.859) (0.802) (0.035) (0.073) (0.088) (0.030) (0.538) (0.665) (0.744) (0.525) 
Hansen OIR (0.357) (0.536) (0.203) (0.259) (0.495) (0.334) (0.573) (0.471) (0.568) (0.182) (0.499) (0.488) 
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.720) (0.251) (0.362) (0.523) (0.606) (0.475) (0.548) (0.495) (0.794) (0.756) (0.820) (0.825) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.200) (0.699) (0.190) (0.185) (0.384) (0.279) (0.508) (0.422) (0.358) (0.072) (0.278) (0.266) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.222) (0.572) (0.132) (0.165) (0.500) (0.253) (0.590) (0.423) (0.702) (0.420) (0.710) (0.690) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.928) (0.321) (0.732) (0.808) (0.381) (0.655) (0.366) (0.517) (0.178) (0.042) (0.104) (0.110) 
             
Fisher  620.96*** 325.8*** 247.5*** 462.2*** 489.31*** 497.40*** 816.2*** 413.06*** 533.27*** 297.48*** 985.9*** 508.1*** 
Instruments  34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Countries  46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Observations  131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the 
validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
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Table 4: Institutional Governance and Terrorism    
             
 Dependent Variables: Institutional Governance  Dynamics 
    
 Rule of Law   (RL) Corruption Control    (CC) Institutional Governance (Intgov) 
    
Constant  -0.226*** -0.120* -0.252*** -0.216*** -0.160* -0.087 -0.133* -0.142 -0.385*** -0.092 -0.351** -0.307** 
 (0.005) (0.076) (0.003) (0.005) (0.094) (0.210) (0.073) (0.102) (0.008) (0.372) (0.010) (0.033) 
RL(-1) 0.853*** 0.906*** 0.850*** 0.851*** --- --- --- -- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
CC(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.884*** 0.891*** 0.861*** 0.910*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Instgov (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.864*** 0.866*** 0.797*** 0.867*** 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Terrorism  0.004 --- --- --- 0.038* --- --- --- 0.061 --- --- --- 
 (0.737)    (0.069)    (0.131)    
Transnational Terrorism  --- -0.029 --- --- --- -0.042 --- --- --- -0.110 --- --- 
  (0.111)    (0.229)    (0.148)   
Unclear Terrorism  --- --- 0.015 --- --- --- 0.040 --- --- --- -0.028 --- 
   (0.716)    (0.427)    (0.791)  
Total Terrorism   --- --- --- -0.008 --- --- --- 0.033 --- --- --- 0.023 
    (0.562)    (0.142)    (0.620) 
Internet  -0.003** 0.001 -0.004* -0.002 -0.005** -0.0005 -0.002 -0.004** -0.015*** 0.002 -0.005 -0.010* 
 (0.031) (0.161) (0.052) (0.114) (0.023) (0.709) (0.282) (0.044) (0.008) (0.636) (0.322) (0.079) 
GDP growth  -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.0005 -0.008 -0.014** -0.014* -0.008 
 (0.279) (0.624) (0.208) (0.173) (0.518) (0.204) (0.356) (0.911) (0.261) (0.030) (0.090) (0.212) 
Inflation   -0.010 -0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.013** -0.014** -0.017** -0.014** -0.018 -0.009 -0.014 -0.010 
 (0.108) (0.645) (0.255) (0.196) (0.041) (0.018) (0.013) (0.031) (0.160) (0.315) (0.211) (0.427) 
Foreign investment  0.002** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002 0.003 0.004* 0.003 0.004 0.005* 0.006** 0.004 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.013) (0.030) (0.332) (0.123) (0.059) (0.107) (0.162) (0.070) (0.028) (0.169) 
Education 0.004*** 0.0008 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.012*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.437) (0.001) (0.003) (0.019) (0.023) (0.004) (0.019) (0.001) (0.200) (0.004) (0.009) 
Government Expenditure 0.0009*** 0.001*** 0.0009**
* 
0.0009**
* 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.012) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
             
             
AR(1) (0.242) (0.151) (0.232) (0.224) (0.061) (0.079) (0.075) (0.062) (0.293) (0.139) (0.278) (0.237) 
AR(2) (0.807) (0.899) (0.753) (0.776) (0.717) (0.445) (0.463) (0.628) (0.740) (0.631) (0.698) (0.946) 
Sargan OIR (0.152) (0.193) (0.293) (0.158) (0.975) (0.854) (0.972) (0.956) (0.705) (0.348) (0.729) (0.595) 
Hansen OIR (0.252) (0.266) (0.276) (0.228) (0.215) (0.597) (0.239) (0.628) (0.518) (0.814) (0.493) (0.423) 
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.444) (0.247) (0.257) (0.277) (0.509) (0.512) (0.601) (0.446) (0.613) (0.529) (0.701) (0.460) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.207) (0.344) (0.350) (0.268) (0.149) (0.560) (0.143) (0.184) (0.405) (0.823) (0.332) (0.387) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.201) (0.271) (0.253) (0.200) (0.231) (0.646) (0.400) (0.270) (0.402) (0.780) (0.582) (0.335) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.548) (0.336) (0.427) (0.441) (0.288) (0.306) (0.094) (0.236) (0.759) (0.577) (0.227) (0.659) 
             
Fisher  611.12*** 454.7*** 507.0*** 587.0*** 170.96*** 152.77*** 238.9*** 164.15*** 250.04*** 415.21*** 315.7*** 246.3*** 
Instruments  34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Countries  46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Observations  131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the 
validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
 
Table 5: General Governance and Terrorism    
     
 Dependent variable: General Governance (G.Gov) 
   
Constant  -0.655*** -0.270** -0.619*** -0.622*** 
 (0.001) (0.028) (0.001) (0.003) 
G.Gov (-1) 0.930*** 0.918*** 0.920*** 0.905*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Terrorism  -0.004 --- --- --- 
 (0.896)    
Transnational Terrorism  --- -0.392*** --- --- 
  (0.000)   
Unclear Terrorism  --- --- -0.072 --- 
   (0.587)  
Total Terrorism   --- --- --- -0.092** 
    (0.024) 
Internet  -0.014** 0.008* -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.029) (0.058) (0.108) (0.181) 
GDP growth  0.030*** 0.021** 0.032*** 0.027*** 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) 
Inflation   -0.0004 0.014 0.008 0.010 
 (0.975) (0.218) (0.494) (0.417) 
Foreign investment  -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006* 
 (0.291) (0.390) (0.510) (0.095) 
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Education 0.013** 0.0007 0.010** 0.012** 
 (0.012) (0.795) (0.024) (0.021) 
Government Expenditure 0.002** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.019) (0.000) (0.012) (0.012) 
     
AR(1) (0.163) (0.037) (0.125) (0.154) 
AR(2) (0.574) (0.512) (0.461) (0.549) 
Sargan OIR (0.287) (0.252) (0.358) (0.244) 
Hansen OIR (0.263) (0.324) (0.269) (0.214) 
     
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group (0.520) (0.626) (0.440) (0.407) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.189) (0.206) (0.227) (0.183) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group (0.380) (0.559) (0.389) (0.322) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.139) (0.072) (0.138) (0.128) 
     
Fisher  1317.78*** 1492.55*** 893.98*** 791.11*** 
Instruments  34 34 34 34 
Countries  46 46 46 46 
Observations  131 131 131 131 
     
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the 
validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
 
 
4.2 Further Discussion of Results and Policy Implications  
 After cross-examining Tables 2-5, two consistent findings are worth elucidating. On 
the one hand, terrorism consistently decreases political governance and its constituent parts. 
On the other, compared to domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism more negatively and 
significantly affect political, economic and general governances. 
 The overwhelming deleterious effect of political governance which confirms the tested 
hypothesis is traceable to the definition of terrorism employed in the general literature. For 
example, according to Enders and Todd (2006), terrorism  can be understood as threatened 
use of force by sub-national actors for the goal of employing intimidation to secure political 
goals. The conception, definition and measurement of terrorism are more skewed towards the 
political dimension of governance. Within this framework, terrorism is designed to either 
influence political governance positively or negatively. The study has found this impact to be 
negative. In other words, terrorism reduces the fair and free election and replacement of 
political leaders. Accordingly, mechanisms of rigging elections may be more apparent in 
hostile environments. Moreover, some liberties including freedom of expression, association 
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with certain political parties and a free media may be curbed with ‘state of emergency laws’ 
during elections when they are characterized by violence and unrests. Ultimately, an 
unsecured environment owing to terrorism does not offer all elements of a political class the 
opportunity of organizing civil campaigns properly as it would be the case in an atmosphere 
without terrorism threats. Moreover, terrorism may provide the incumbent government with 
the leverage of using the heightened risk of violence with associated national unrest in 
maintaining their grip on power. This narrative is consistent with Park and Bali (2016) on the 
relationship between terrorism and political survival.  
 The higher magnitude of transnational terrorism compared with domestic terrorism 
could also be explained by the fact that the relationship between terrorism and political 
survival is more apparent with transnational terrorism (see Park & Bali, 2016). Beyond 
citizens rallying around elected leaders in threatening times; transnational terrorism in 
undermining ‘incumbent target governments’ also damages society’s general well-being. This 
dimension of welfare is more related to deteriorating economic governance than political 
governance because the definition of economic governance is more aligned with living 
standard. This insight also doubles as an explanation as to why the negative magnitude of 
transnational terrorism is consistently significant in economic governance.  
 As a policy implication, terrorism more negatively affects the election and 
replacement of political leaders (political governance) compared with the formulation and 
implication of policies that deliver public commodities (economic governance). Conversely, it 
does not significantly influence the respect by the state and citizens of institutions that govern 
interactions between them (institutional governance).  
 The comparatively high relevance of terrorism on political governance is supported by 
the evidence in the literature which for the most part has established how terror events are 
likely to affect political outcomes (see Berrebi & Klor 2006; Siqueira & Sandler 2007). Most 
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notably that terrorism: determines voters’ views and the constitution of governments 
(Jacobson, 2003; Langer & Cohen, 2005) and influences the survival and effectiveness of 
incumbent target governments (Indridason et al., 2008; Williams, 2012).  
 
5. Conclusion and further research directions  
This study has investigated how terrorism affects governance indicators in 53 African 
countries for the period 1998-2012. Four terrorism indicators are used. They are: domestic, 
transnational, unclear and total terrorism. Four composite governance indicators with six 
unbundled components are also employed. They comprised (1) political governance 
(consisting of (i) political stability and (ii) voice and accountability), (2) economic 
governance (encompassing (iii) government effectiveness and (iv) regulation quality); (3) 
institutional governance (involving (v) corruption-control and (vi) the rule of law) and (4) 
general governance. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments. 
The following findings are established. First, all terrorism dynamics significantly negatively 
affect political governance and its unbundled constituents. Second,  a weak negative 
relationship is  evident with regards to economic governance and its separate parts. Third, no 
sign of a connection is established with respect to institutional governance and its individual 
components. Compared to domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism more negatively and 
significantly affects political, economic and general governances.   
 Further studies can improve the extant literature by assessing the cost and 
effectiveness of the different policy tools by which the negative effect of terrorism on political 
governance can be reduced.  Potential policy initiatives could include, inter alia: greater 
regional integration, military expenditure and inclusive human development. Moreover, 
owing to a lack of space, hypotheses corresponding to all possible combinations between the 
ten governance variables and four terrorism variables could not be exhaustively engaged. 
Hence, since it is likely that different types of terrorism affect the different types of 
29 
 
governance differently, separate hypothesis for each specific type should be provided in future 
studies along the lines of the few theories involved in this paper.  
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
VA “Voice and accountability (estimate) measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality 
of public services, the quality and degree of independence 
from political pressures of the civil service, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  
Quality  
RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-
Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
General 
Governance  
G.gov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances   
PCA 
    
Domestic 
terrorism 
Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (in Ln)  
 
Ender et al. (2011) 
and 
   
Transnational 
terrorism  
Tranter Number of Transnational terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
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Uuclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category is unclear (in 
Ln) 
Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) 
 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
    
Internet   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Inflation Consumer Price Index  (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign 
investment   
FDI Foreign direct investment net inflows  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Education   Educ Secondary school enrolment (% of Gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Government 
Expenditure  
G.Exp. Government’s Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis. Ln: Natural logarithm.  
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.551 0.929 -3.297 1.087 265 
Voice & Accountability  -0.679 0.723 -2.155 1.009 265 
Political Governance  0.0008 1.268 -3.304 2.671 265 
Government Effectiveness  -0.723 0.620 -2.354 0.823 265 
Regulation Quality  -0.695 0.638 -2.630 0.906 265 
Economic Governance  0.009 1.354 -3.951 3.511 265 
Rule of Law -0.706 0.660 -2.595 1.032 265 
Control of Corruption  -0.602 0.577 -1.848 0.971 265 
Institutional Governance 0.003 1.349 -3.490 3.316 265 
General Governance 0.008 2.170 -6.208 5.242 265 
Domestic terrorism  0.401 0.805 0.000 4.781 265 
Transnational terrorism 0.203 0.451 0.000 2.802 265 
Unclear terrorism 0.060 0.193 0.000 1.566 265 
Total terrorism 0.500 0.885 0.000 4.895 265 
Internet penetration  4.766 8.022 0.002 51.174 264 
GDP growth  4.706 4.230 -8.149 32.265 259 
Inflation   10.012 25.435 -6.934 275.983 242 
Foreign direct investment   5.125 7.175 -4.265 52.398 259 
Education (secondary)   42.416 25.022 5.608 111.454 201 
Government Expenditure  8.715 22.623 -62.668 206.7 206 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix 
                     
Political governance  Economic governance  Institutional governance   Control variables  Terrorism variables  
PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov G.gov Internet FDI GDPg Inflation Educ  G.Exp. Domter Tranter Unclter Totter  
1.000 0.658 0.906 0.643 0.608 0.644 0.771 0.758 0.755 0.805 0.084 0.033 -0.074 -0.234 0.368 -0.188 -0.605 -0.584 -0.453 -0.652 PS 
 1.000 0.914 0.719 0.730 0.745 0.715 0.773 0.765 0.849 0.187 -0.092 -0.184 -0.049 0.390 -0.126 -0.263 -0.276 -0.160 -0.287 VA 
  1.000 0.749 0.736 0.764 0.783 0.841 0.835 0.909 0.150 -0.033 -0.143 -0.153 0.416 -0.172 -0.473 -0.469 -0.334 -0.512 Polgov 
   1.000 0.890 0.975 0.872 0.892 0.907 0.935 0.303 -0.178 -0.184 -0.112 0.570 -0.143 -0.225 -0.271 -0.175 -0.256 GE 
    1.000 0.969 0.799 0.852 0.849 0.906 0.285 -0.226 -0.263 -0.130 0.481 -0.218 -0.186 -0.246 -0.125 -0.216 RQ 
     1.000 0.862 0.898 0.905 0.948 0.303 -0.206 -0.227 -0.124 0.543 -0.184 -0.212 -0.267 -0.156 -0.244 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.888 0.970 0.960 0.224 -0.099 -0.269 -0.166 0.523 -0.172 -0.294 -0.335 -0.278 -0.336 CC 
       1.000 0.973 0.929 0.302 -0.129 -0.241 -0.161 0.583 -0.194 -0.304 -0.308 -0.229 -0.335 RL 
        1.000 0.972 0.270 -0.117 -0.263 -0.169 0.568 -0.188 -0.307 -0.331 -0.262 -0.345 Instgov 
         1.000 0.261 -0.130 -0.024 -0.220 0.545 -0.192 -0.341 -0.369 -0.262 -0.379 G.gov 
          1.000 -0.103 -0.023 -0.062 0.535 -0.021 0.146 0.164 0.187 0.145 Internet 
           1.000 0.482 0.105 -0.066 0.106 -0.133 -0.082 -0.107 -0.135 FDI 
            1.000 0.124 -0.220 0.249 -0.006 0.007 0.041 -0.007 GDPg 
             1.000 -0.003 0.195 0.181 0.247 0.202 0.196 Inflation 
              1.000 -0.061 0.036 -0.071 0.012 -0.0006 Educ 
               1.000 0.095 0.221 -0.164 0.135 G.Exp. 
                1.000 0.699 0.785 0.978 Domter 
                 1.000 0.707 0.803 Tranter 
                  1.000 0.810 Unclter 
                   1.000 Totter 
                     
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: 
Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. G.Gov: General Governance. Internet: Internet Penetration. Educ: Secondary School enrolment.. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product 
Growth. G.Exp: Government Expenditure. Domter: Domestic Terrorism. Tranter: Transnational Terrorism. Unclter: Unclear Terrorism. Totter: Total Terrorism.   
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Appendix 4: Persistence of governance  
           
 PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov G.gov 
PS(-1) 0.925          
VA(-1)  0.953         
Polgov(-1)   0.955        
GE(-1)    0.965       
RQ(-1)     0.966      
Ecogov(-1)      0.966     
CC(-1)       0.936    
RL(-1)        0.966   
Instgov(-1)         0.963  
G.gov(-1)          0.971 
           
PS: Politcal Stability. PS(-1): lagged value of Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: 
Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: 
Institutional Governance. G.Gov: General Governance.  
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